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Abstract  
In everyday social life, we predict others’ actions in response to our own actions. 
Subsequently, on the basis of these predictions, we control our actions to attain desired 
social outcomes and/or adjust our actions to accommodate the anticipated actions of the 
others. Representation of the bidirectional association between our and others’ actions, 
that is, intersubjective action-effect binding, could make such intersubjective action 
control easier and smoother. The present study investigated not only whether or not 
intersubjective action-effect binding was acquired but also whether or not eye contact 
modulated it. Experiment 1 showed that after a repeated experience during which 
participants’ finger movements triggered a target female individual’s mouth gesture, 
observing the target’s mouth gestures came to automatically trigger the participants’ 
finger movements. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that this effect was not observed when 
the target’s gaze direction was averted (Experiment 2) or when the target’s eyes were 
closed (Experiment 3) throughout the acquisition phase. These results indicate that 
intersubjective action-effect binding occurs and that an ostensive signal, that is, eye 
contact modulates it. 
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1. Introduction 
How do we become intentional agents? Inspired by Lotze (1852) and Harleß 
(1861), James (1890) indicated that we cannot perform an act voluntarily unless we can 
foresee its effects. Voluntary action is taken according to our anticipation of the 
movements’ sensible effects. We can voluntarily act only by anticipating the effects of 
the movement. In James’ words, “when a particular movement, having once occurred in 
a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image of itself in the memory, then the 
movement can be desired again, proposed as an end, deliberately willed” (James, 1890, 
Vol. 2, p. 487). Later, James’ idea was further elaborated by Elsner and Hommel (2001), 
who proposed a two-stage model of acquisition of voluntary action control. According 
to their model, in the first stage, randomly produced movements lead to specific, 
perceivable changes in the environment. After repeated co-occurrences between 
movements and their effects, the motor pattern of that action becomes associated with 
that effect in a bidirectional manner. In the second stage, once such a bidirectional 
action-effect association has been acquired, actions are automatically activated by 
anticipation of their effects. Thus, movements come to be intentionally executed by 
activating the perceptual codes that represent the desired goal (i.e., expected effect). 
Once bidirectional association between movement and effect is acquired, it has 
several functions other than action control. James (1890) noted a report by Lotze (1852) 
that the thrust of a sword triggered slight movements of spectators’ arms. Later theory 
has suggested that such automatic mimicry allows us to directly understand the 
meanings of actions by internally replicating them without any explicit reflective 
mediation (e.g., Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). In addition, it also contributes to 
the self/other distinction. My observed leg movement (and/or the feeling of my leg 
moving) is perfectly contingent upon my motor commands (or predictions based on 
motor commands), but another person’s is not (e.g., Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Daprati, 
et al., 1997; Morgan & Rochat, 1997; Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 
2005). Moreover, self-produced sensations or distal effects can be correctly predicted on 
the basis of motor commands. This predictable component is removed from incoming 
sensory signals, thereby attenuating the sensory effect of self-generated movement. 
Such a mechanism enables differentiation between self-produced and externally 
generated sensations, thereby producing a sense of self-agency (i.e., the sense that I am 
the one who causes the action) (Bays, Flanagan, & Wolpert, 2006; Blakemore, Frith, & 
Wolpert, 1999; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). 
To test their model, Elsner and Hommel (2001) conducted several influential 
experiments. Their experiments consisted of two phases: an acquisition phase and a test 
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phase. In the acquisition phase, participants experienced co-occurrences between left 
and right key presses and low- and high-pitched tones. In the subsequent test phase, 
participants were instructed to respond to the tones now used as imperative stimuli as 
quickly and correctly as possible according to a fixed stimulus-response mapping. 
Participants were randomly divided into two groups: the non-reversal and reversal 
groups. For the non-reversal group, the stimulus-response mapping in the test phase was 
consistent with the response-stimulus mapping acquired in the preceding acquisition 
phase. For the reversal group, the stimulus-response mapping was inconsistent with the 
response-stimulus mapping acquired in the preceding acquisition phase. The logic was 
as follows: if participants had acquired bidirectional associations between responses and 
tones, then presenting the tones should activate the associated responses. Therefore, 
response-compatible tones should allow for faster responses than response-incompatible 
tones. Their results supported this assumption. In the next experiment, they showed that 
acquired bidirectional action-effect associations also biased participants’ freely made 
choices according to the learned associations. The acquisition of action-effect 
representations depends on both the temporal contiguity and the contingency between 
an action and an effect (contingency is the extent to which an action reliably predicts an 
effect), thus suggesting that action-effect representations are acquired by associative 
learning mechanisms (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). Action-effect binding can occur for 
voluntary nonactions and their effects (Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass, 2009). Moreover, 
action-effect associations can be acquired not only through active experience, but also 
through observing the actions of others (Paulus, van Dam, Hunnius, Lindemann, & 
Bekkering, 2011). A recent study showed that even 9-month-olds can acquire 
bidirectional action-effect associations through active experience (Verschoor, Weidema, 
Biro, & Hommel, 2010). 
Although a number of studies have investigated action control in the physical 
world, it remains unclear whether or not bidirectional associations can be acquired even 
between one’s own and another person’s actions. Such intersubjective action-effect 
binding is important in the following respect: in daily life, we predict others’ actions in 
response to our actions, and we select and control our actions to obtain desired 
responses from others on the basis of these predictions. Moreover, successful joint 
action in which co-actors cooperate to attain shared goals depends on the ability to 
integrate the predicted effects of one’s own and others’ actions (e.g., Sebanz, Bekkering, 
& Knoblich, 2006). In particular, when attainment of shared goals requires opposing or 
complementary actions between co-actors, we must adjust our actions to accommodate 
the anticipated actions of others. In that case, intersubjective action-effect binding 
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would enable smooth cooperation between co-actors. In addition to intersubjective 
action control and action understanding, intersubjective action-effect binding would 
contribute to the development of the sense of social agency (i.e., the sense that I am the 
one who causes and/or controls the other’s action) or “interpersonal self” (Neisser, 
1988), just like action-effect binding does to the development of the sense of 
self-agency in the physical world. In this study, by using a similar paradigm to Elsner 
and Hommel (2001), we investigated whether or not intersubjective action-effect 
binding was acquired (Experiment 1) and whether or not eye contact modulated it 
(Experiments 2 and 3).  
Each experiment consisted of two phases: an acquisition phase and a test phase. 
In the acquisition phase, participants learned that each button press triggered a mouth 
gesture of a target female individual. In the test phase, previous effect stimuli were used 
as primes. If participants have acquired bidirectional associations between their own 
actions and the target individual’s actions, presenting the effect-prime (mouth gesture) 
should activate the associated responses (finger movement). Therefore, responses 
should be facilitated when primed (observed) and required responses are congruent and 
should be interfered when they are incongruent. Moreover, given that eye contact 
modulates various aspects of the cognitive processing and/or behavioral responses 
which take place concurrent to or immediately following it (e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 
2009; Farroni, Mansfield, Lai, & Johnson, 2003; Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 
2002; Mason, Hood, & Macrae, 2004; Senju & Csibra, 2008; Senju & Johnson, 2009), 
eye contact should also modulate an intersubjective action-effect binding.   
     In Experiment 1, the target individual’s gaze direction was always direct 
throughout the acquisition phase, whereas in Experiment 2, the target’s gaze direction 
was always averted. In Experiment 3, the target individual’s eyes were always closed.  
Even if evidence is obtained showing that presenting an effect-prime activates the 
associated responses, it is possible that participants have simply acquired bidirectional 
associations between their actions and the change in photographs. In that case, the 
observed effect might be simply caused by the well-established action-visual event 
integration and priming rather than intersubjective action-effect binding, in which case 
it would have nothing to do with intersubjectivity. The findings that the presence or 
absence of eye contact modulates this effect would exclude this possibility and clarify 
the conditions under which intersubjective action-effect binding is facilitated. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Methods 
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2.1.1. Participants  
Twenty-two healthy, right-handed volunteers participated in this study. The 
participants were 8 male and 14 female individuals ranging in age from 19 to 25 years, 
with a mean age of 21.26 years. None had a history of neurological or psychiatric 
disease. All participants gave written informed consent but were naïve as to the purpose 
of the experiment. 
2.1.2. Stimuli.  
The four photographs (7.63° high and 4.77° wide) of the same female individual 
whose face was depicted in front view were used as stimuli with directed eyes. These 
stimuli were identical except for the mouth gestures depicted therein: mouth closing, lip 
protrusion, tongue protrusion, or cheeks puffing. A pilot study (N = 32) showed that the 
following four gestures were judged as having neutral affect on a 9-point scale ranging 
from negative (-4) to positive (4): mouth closing (M = -0.47, SD = 0.67), lip protrusion 
(M = 0.47, SD = 0.98), tongue protrusion (M = -0.19, SD = 0.99), and cheeks puffing (M 
= -0.62, SD = 0.97).  
2.1.3. Procedure  
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were seated 60 cm from a 17-in. 
monitor. Experiment 1 consisted of two phases: an acquisition phase and a test phase. 
2.1.3.1. Acquisition phase  
Participants were told to make a self-paced left button press with left index finger 
or a right button press with the right index finger. They were instructed to choose freely 
which button to press, but they were instructed to press the buttons in a random order 
and about equally often. Each trial started with the presentation of the photograph of the 
female face with mouth closed. This stimulus remained on the center of the monitor 
until the participants pressed the left or right button. After 50 ms had elapsed following 
each button press, a certain mouth gesture was presented for 300 ms: lip protrusion, 
tongue protrusion, or cheeks puffing (Figure 1a). In one example condition, the left 
button press triggered lip protrusion, while the right button press triggered tongue 
protrusion. The assignment of mouth gestures to buttons was consistent for each 
participant and counterbalanced across participants. The participants were not informed 
about the response-effect mapping but were told that the mouth gestures were 
completely irrelevant to the task (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Each participant performed 
300 acquisition trials. 
 
 
Intersubjective action-effect binding 6 
 
 
 
time
left
button 
press
right
button 
press
(a)
time
left
button 
press
right
button 
press
(b)
  
time
left
button 
press
right
button 
press
(c)
 
prime
*
#
target
(d)
time
left button 
press ⇒
congruent
right button 
press ⇒
incongruent
 
 
Figure 1  Schematic representations of the acquisition phase in Experiments 1(a), 2 (b) 
and 3 (c) and a schematic representation of test phase (d). In the case of (a), if a 
requested response to “＊” is pressing the left button, the requested response is 
congruent with the primed response. 
 
 
2.1.3.2. Test phase 
In the test phase, the above effect stimuli were used as primes. If participants had 
acquired bidirectional associations between actions and effects, presenting an 
effect-prime should activate the associated responses. Therefore, reaction times (RTs) 
should be slower when primed and required responses are incongruent than when they 
are congruent. Each trial started with the presentation of an effect-prime (300 ms 
duration). The primes consisted of the photographs of faces with lip protrusion, tongue 
protrusion, and cheeks puffing. Two of these faces had been used as effect stimuli in the 
preceding acquisition phase, whereas the remaining one had not been presented. After 
the presentation of the prime, one of two target stimuli was presented (“＊” (sized 0.6 × 
0.6 cm) or “#” (sized 0.6 × 0.6 cm)). Participants were instructed to ignore the prime 
Intersubjective action-effect binding 7 
 
 
 
stimuli and to press the left button with the left index finger whenever a “＊” appeared 
on the center of the monitor and the right button with the right index finger whenever a 
“#” appeared on the monitor as quickly and accurately as possible (Figure 1 (d)). 
Stimulus-response mapping was counterbalanced across participants. The next trial 
started after a 1-s delay. 
The design of this experiment had one within-participants factor: congruency 
between primed and required responses (congruent or incongruent). In the congruent 
and incongruent conditions, the above effect stimuli were used as primes. The test phase 
consisted of 120 trials (40 per condition). In the remaining 40 trials, the non-presented 
stimuli from the acquisition phase were used as the primes. The trials were presented in 
random order. 
 
2.2. Results and discussion 
2.2.1. Acquisition phase.  
The participants rendered button presses at a rate of about one per second (M = 
1059 ms, SD = 212 ms). The proportions of left and right button presses were calculated 
in order to confirm whether or not the participants pressed each button equally as often. 
A t-test revealed that participants pressed the left and right buttons equally often 
(49.85% vs. 50.15%, respectively; t(21) = .30, p=.766). 
2.2.2. Test phase 
Error rates (M = 2.43% of trials) were submitted to a paired t test according to the 
design in the previous section. There was no significant difference between congruent 
and incongruent conditions, t(21) =－.97, p = .342. The mean RTs for correct responses 
were analyzed using a paired t test with the same design. As shown in Figure 2, the RTs 
were significantly faster in the congruent condition (M = 447 ms, SEM = 10.16) than in 
the incongruent condition (M = 463 ms, SEM = 9.72), t(21)=－4.70, p < .001, r=.72.  
As noted above, if participants have acquired bidirectional associations between 
actions and effects, then presenting an effect-prime should activate the associated 
responses. Therefore, responses should be facilitated when the primed (observed) and 
required responses are congruent and should be interfered when they are incongruent. 
The present results showed this pattern. In this study, participants were told that the 
mouth gestures were completely irrelevant to the task in the acquisition phase and 
instructed to ignore the task-irrelevant prime stimuli in the test phase. Nonetheless, their 
behaviors were influenced by the task-irrelevant prime stimuli. These results were 
consistent with previous studies that showed that bidirectional associations can be 
automatically acquired and further demonstrated that presenting effect stimuli can 
Intersubjective action-effect binding 8 
 
 
 
automatically activate associated responses (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). The present 
results extend previous findings by showing that action-effect binding can occur even 
between actions of the self and those of another.  
 
 
 
Figure 2  Mean reaction times for congruent and incongruent trials in Experiment 1 
(eye contact), Experiment 2 (averted gaze), and Experiment 3 (closed eyes). Error bars 
represent standard error. 
 
However, is the interaction measured by this experiment truly social? There is a 
possibility that participants had only acquired bidirectional associations between their 
actions and the change in photographs. If so, these results might have shown nothing 
more than the well-established concept of automatic action-visual event integration and 
priming. To exclude this possibility, in Experiment 2, face photographs of the female 
individual with averted gazes were used as the stimuli. Previous social cognitive studies 
have revealed that perceived eye contact with another human face modulates various 
aspects of the cognitive processing and/or behavioral response which take place 
concurrent to or immediately following it (e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Farroni, et al., 
2003; Macrae, et al., 2002; Mason, et al., 2004; Senju & Csibra, 2008; Senju & Johnson, 
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2009). For example, eye contact triggers subsequent gaze following and enhances 
automatic mimicry of observed hand movements (Farroni, et al., 2003; Wang, Newport, 
& Hamilton, 2011). In addition, direct gaze captures visuospatial attention and 
facilitates face recognition (Guellai & Streri, 2011; Macrae, et al., 2002; Mason, et al., 
2004; von Grünau, & Anston, 1995). Given these results, if the results of Experiment 1 
are truly social in nature, eye contact should modulate the observed effect. Experiment 2 
tested this hypothesis.   
 
3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Methods 
3.1.1. Participants  
Another 22 healthy, right-handed volunteers participated in this study; the 
participants were 7 male and 15 female individuals ranging in age from 18 to 23 years 
(M = 20.78 years). None had a history of neurological or psychiatric disease. All 
participants gave written informed consent but were naïve as to the purpose of the 
experiment. 
3.1.2. Stimuli   
The stimuli were the same as those in Experiment 1, except that all gazes depicted 
in the photographic stimuli were averted (Figure 1b). Averted gazes to the left were used 
throughout the experiment for one-half of the participants, and averted gazes to the right 
were used for the other half. Thus, gaze directions were constant through the experiment 
as in Experiment 1. 
3.1.3. Procedure  
The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1.  
 
3.2. Results and discussion 
3.2.1. Acquisition phase   
Participants made button presses at the rate of about one button per second (M = 
992 ms, SD = 222 ms). This pace did not significantly differ from that observed in 
Experiment 1 (t(42) = -1.01, p = .315). Participants pressed the left and right buttons 
about equally as often (49.18% vs. 50.82%, respectively, t(21) = -1.66, p = .111). These 
proportions did not significantly differ from those observed in Experiment 1 (t(42) = 
-1.01, p = .315). 
3.2.2. Test phase   
Error rates (M = 2.84% of trials) were submitted to a paired t test. There was no 
significant difference between congruent and incongruent conditions, t(21) =－1.03, p 
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= .313. The mean RTs for correct responses were analyzed using a paired t test with the 
same design. As shown in Figure 2, There was no significant difference between 
congruent and incongruent conditions, t(21) =－1.44, p = .165.  
In Experiment 2, face photographs with averted gazes were used as the primes in 
the test session. Thus, there is a possibility that gaze direction (left or right) has primed 
spatially compatible responses similar to the Simon task (e.g., Ansorge, 2003; Zorzi, 
Mapelli, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2003). To examine this possibility, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA for RTs with two within-participants factors was conducted: one factor was 
congruency with the primed and required responses (congruent, incongruent, or 
non-presented stimuli from the acquisition phase); another factor was spatial 
correspondence between gaze direction and required response side (corresponding or 
non-corresponding). This analysis revealed no significant main effects or interaction, Fs 
= .60, p > .446, partial η2 < .028. These results suggest that the spatial correspondence 
between gaze direction and response side did not affect the results observed in 
Experiment 2. Unlike previous studies that found the“gaze-direction Simon effect” (in 
which the left- or right-gazing stimulus was presented in a random order), gaze direction 
was always constant throughout the test session in Experiment 2. This may be why the 
gaze-direction Simon effect was not observed in Experiment 2.  
To confirm whether the presence or absence of eye contact modulated 
intersubjective action-effect binding, ANOVAs were conducted for the combined data 
from Experiments 1 and 2 with one within-participants factor (congruency) and one 
between-participants factor (gaze direction). Using error rate as the dependent variable, 
there were no significant main effects (congruency, F(1, 42) = 1.94, p = .171; gaze 
direction, F(1, 42) = .76, p = .387) or interaction (F(1, 42) = .12, p = .729). Using the 
mean RTs as dependent variables, there was a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 
42) = 18.44, p < .001, partial η2 = .31. Post-hoc analysis (Bonferroni, p < .05) revealed 
that RTs were significantly faster in the congruent condition (M = 452 ms, SEM = 6.88) 
than in the incongruent condition (M = 462 ms, SEM = 6.61). There was no significant 
main effect of gaze direction, F(1, 42) = .11, p = .741. More importantly, there was a 
significant interaction between congruency and gaze direction, F(1, 42) = 4.77, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .102. This interaction is explained by the fact that RTs were significantly 
faster in the congruent condition than in the incongruent condition in Experiment 1 
whereas there was no significant difference between the two in Experiment 2. 
These results indicated that eye contact did modulate intersubjective action-effect 
binding. This observed effect of eye contact was not due to a general arousal effect, as 
there was no significant main effect of gaze direction. Nevertheless, the present results 
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do not imply that action-effect binding would never occur without eye contact. In the 
present study, the effect-stimuli were more complex than those previously used (e.g., an 
800-Hz tone), but they were presented for only 300 ms. Thus, there is a possibility that 
action-effect binding might have occurred only under an elevated number of acquisition 
trials or a lengthened presentation duration of effect-stimuli. Nevertheless, even under 
such restricted circumstances, evidence of action-effect binding was obtained in the 
presence of eye contact (Experiment 1). These results may suggest that human beings 
have an input bias towards socially significant and/or rewarding events, like mutual 
gaze. Consistent with this suggestion, previous studies have shown that ostensive 
signals of being addressed by communication, such as direct gazes, significantly 
modulate behavioral responses and learning which take place concurrently or 
immediately afterwards (e.g., Senju, & Csibra, 2008; Topál, Gergely, Miklósi, 
Erdohegyi, & Csibra, 2008; Wang, et al., 2011).  
However, in Experiment 2, the target individual’s gaze was always averted to the 
left or right side through the acquisition phase. Given that observing another person’s 
averted gaze automatically shifts spatial attention (e.g., Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000), 
the present results may have been caused by participants’ visual attention being 
distracted away from the center of the monitor. To exclude this possibility, in 
Experiment 3, face photographs of the female individual with closed eyes were used as 
the stimuli. If eye contact truly modulates intersubjective action-effect binding, a 
significant interaction between congruency and the presence or absence of eye contact 
should be observed even when face photographs with closed eyes were used as the 
stimuli. Experiment 3 tested this hypothesis. 
 
4. Experiment 3 
4.1. Methods 
4.1.1. Participants   
Another 22 healthy, right-handed volunteers participated in this study; the 
participants were 6 male and 16 female individuals ranging in age from 19 to 23 years 
(M = 21.00 years). None had a history of neurological or psychiatric disease. All 
participants gave written informed consent but were naïve as to the purpose of the 
experiment. 
4.1.2. Stimuli   
The stimuli were the same as those in Experiment 1, except that the female 
individual’s eyes were closed (Figure 1c).  
4.1.3. Procedure 
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The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1.  
 
4.2. Results and discussion 
4.2.1. Acquisition phase 
Participants made button presses at the rate of about one button per second (M = 
1058 ms, SD = 263 ms). This pace did not significantly differ from that observed in 
Experiment 1 (t(42) =.01, p = .996). Participants pressed the left and right buttons about 
equally as often (49.76% vs. 50.24%, respectively, t(21) = .48, p = .635). These 
proportions did not significantly differ from those observed in Experiment 1 (t(42) = 
－.13, p = .899). 
4.2.2. Test phase    
Error rates (M = 1.59% of trials) were submitted to a paired t test. There was no 
significant difference between congruent and incongruent conditions, t(21) =－.90, p 
= .378. The mean RTs for correct responses were analyzed using a paired t test with the 
same design. As shown in Figure 2, There was no significant difference between 
congruent and incongruent conditions, t(21) =－.24, p = .810. 
To confirm whether the results were influenced by the presence or absence of eye 
contact, ANOVAs were conducted for the combined data from Experiments 1 and 3 
with one within-participants factor (congruency) and one between-participants factor 
(eye contact). Using error rate as the dependent variable, there were no significant main 
effects (congruency, F(1, 42) = 1.75, p = .194; eye contact, F(1, 42) =1.25, p = .271) or 
interaction (F(1, 42) = .00, p = 1.00). Using the mean RTs as dependent variables, there 
was a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 42) = 12.05, p < .005, partial η2 = .22. 
Post-hoc analysis (Bonferroni, p < .05) revealed that RTs were significantly faster in the 
congruent condition (M = 450 ms, SEM = 6.78) than in the incongruent condition (M = 
458 ms, SEM = 6.78). There was no significant main effect of eye contact, F(1, 42) 
= .02, p = .877. More importantly, there was a significant interaction between 
congruency and eye contact, F(1, 42) = 9.72, p < .005, partial η2 = .188. This interaction 
is explained by the fact that RTs were significantly faster in the congruent condition 
than in the incongruent condition in Experiment 1, whereas there was no significant 
difference between the two in Experiment 3. 
To exclude the potentially confounding factor of gaze following, face 
photographs with closed eyes were used as the stimuli in Experiment 3. Nevertheless, 
the presence or absence of eye contact significantly modulated the results. As in 
Experiment 2, given that there was no significant main effect of eye contact, this 
observed effect of eye contact was not due to a general arousal effect. Taken together 
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with the results of Experiment 2, these results strongly indicated that eye contact did 
modulate intersubjective action-effect binding.  
 
5. General discussion 
The present study revealed two important findings. The first was that bidirectional 
associations between motor patterns and events could be acquired even between one’s 
own actions and another person’s actions. The second finding was that eye contact 
modulated such intersubjective action-effect binding. 
Previous studies have shown that social contingency plays a crucial role in social 
interaction and learning (e.g., Kuhl, Tsao, & Liu, 2003; Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; 
Okanda & Itakura, 2008; Nadel, Carchon, Kervella, Marcelli, & Réserbat-Plantey, 
1999). In infant-mother interactions, for example, Murray and Trevarthen (1985) 
showed that by 6 weeks of age, infants already displayed more positive affect during 
live (variably contingent) interactions with their mothers and more negative affect while 
viewing replayed interactions. Indeed, contingent interactions with a live person activate 
the reward, attention, and social-cognitive systems (e.g., Redcay, et al., 2010), thus 
facilitating early human learning (e.g., Kuhl, et al., 2003). However, in the present study, 
both temporal contiguity (50 ms delay) and contingency (each button press was a 
perfect predictor of the mouth gesture of the target female) were constant in all 
experiments. Thus, the present results cannot be attributed entirely to social 
contingency. 
Naturally, even if observing mouth gestures triggers an observers’ corresponding 
mouth gestures (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), it does not trigger the observers’ finger 
movements. In most cases, these phenomena are explained by the direct matching 
hypothesis, which postulates that imitation is based on an innate mechanism—such as 
mirror neurons—that directly maps the observed action to an internal motor 
representation of that action (e.g., Rizzolatti, et al., 2001). Indeed, a number of studies 
have demonstrated that observing an index-finger movement automatically triggers an 
index-finger movement rather than a middle-finger movement (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000). It has also been suggested that such a system contributes 
not only to resolution of the corresponding problem (how another’s action can be 
translated into one’s own action, or vice versa) but also to action understanding (e.g., 
Rizzolatti, et al., 2001). However, through a very simple associative learning process, 
the target female’s mouth gesture in the present study did activate participants’ 
corresponding finger movements. Recently, Heyes (2001) and Heyes (2010) has 
proposed that mirror neurons are a product of associative learning: that is, each mirror 
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neuron is forged through the correlated experience of observing and performing the 
same action. In support of her associative hypothesis, Catmur, Gillmeister, Bird, Liepelt, 
Brass and Heyes (2008) demonstrated that after repeatedly observing a foot lift while a 
hand was concurrently lifted, and vice versa, the cortical area that responds more 
strongly to observation of hand actions also showed greater responses to observation of 
foot actions. The present results are in line with her proposal and extend it by showing 
that through the correlated experience of executing a finger movement and observing 
another’s mouth gesture, observing another’s mouth gesture can activate one’s own 
finger movement.  
As noted above, the present findings suggest that intersubjective action-effect 
binding proceeds according to general-purpose learning mechanisms, which are 
common in other species. So, why are human beings so good at intersubjective 
action-effect binding? The finding that eye contact modulated intersubjective 
action-effect binding may provide a clue. Although all experiments in the present study 
used the same procedure, the evidence of intersubjective action-effect binding was not 
obtained when there was no eye contact (Experiment 2 and 3). These results suggest 
that human beings are biased towards socially significant stimuli, as conveyed by eye 
contact. In humans, even newborns prefer to look at faces with direct gazes over faces 
with averted gazes (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002). In addition, even in 
newborns, eye contact facilitates face recognition (Guellai & Streri, 2011). Senju and 
Johnson (2009) propose the neural basis of such an effect of eye contact: they postulate 
that the subcortical pathway including the superior colliculus, pulvinar, and 
amygdale—which is relatively mature even in infants—rapidly detects eye contact (or 
socially significant stimuli), and then it regulates subsequent cortical processing in the 
areas to which it projects in a top-down fashion. In addition, they propose that although 
detection of eye contact initially activates a widespread cortical structure, postnatal 
social experience interacts with the innate architectural bias to narrow down widespread 
activation to form specialized connections between subcortical and cortical structures 
during the course of development. As Farroni et al. (2002) suggest, human infants are 
equipped with a bias to detect and orient towards faces that make eye contact with them. 
Moreover, in our social lives, important information is often conveyed through eye 
contact. Such a cultural habitus might further shape our input bias towards socially 
significant and/or rewarding events by making such stimuli more salient. Although 
intersubjective action-effect binding depends on general-purpose learning mechanisms, 
our innate and/or culturally inherited input bias modulates or guides our learning, thus 
allowing for intersubjective action-effect binding. If this is true, then individuals with 
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autism spectrum disorder, in whom the development of eye contact might be disrupted 
(e.g., Senju & Johnson, 2009), might display difficulties in the development of 
intersubjective action-effect binding even if they easily acquire bidirectional 
associations between their actions and effects in the physical world. Consequently, they 
might display difficulties in the development of the sense of social agency, despite an 
intact sense of self-agency in the physical world. Future research is required to test this 
hypothesis. 
The present findings have several implications. In everyday life, we predict other 
people’s actions in response to our actions, and then, based on these predictions, we 
control our actions to attain desired social outcomes and/or adjust our actions to 
accommodate the anticipated actions of others. The present results suggest that 
intersubjective action-effect binding contributes to such intersubjective action control. 
Moreover, in joint action settings, co-actors are often required to select opposing or 
complementary rather than identical actions in order to achieve shared goals. In such 
cases, automatic imitation through direct matching may even be an obstacle to 
successful cooperation between persons. In this regard, intersubjective action-effect 
binding will enable smooth cooperation between persons. In addition, George Herbert 
Mead (1934) suggested that we know ourselves through the actions others take in 
response to our actions. In his theory, to take the attitude of another is to evoke within 
oneself another’s response that is triggered by one’s own actions. We act in anticipation 
of the responses of other people. These responses in anticipation of responses make for 
a dialectical self: the attitudes of others constitute the organized “me,” and then one 
reacts toward that construct as “I.” Beyond dyadic interactions, in games like baseball 
or football, we are required to learn not only the responses of specific others but also the 
actions associated with every position on the field. That is, we must take on the 
organized and generalized attitude of a social group (i.e., the generalized other). 
According to Mead, a mature sense of self can be achieved by learning to respond to 
and take on the attitude of the generalized other. Thus, in different terms, intersubjective 
action-effect binding constitutes the very basis of Mead’s theory. Intersubjective 
action-effect binding has the potential to clarify not only how representations of society 
or social norms are formed (e.g., it may be a hierarchically organized system of multiple 
intersubjective action-effect bindings), but also how self-consciousness emerges. 
The present study has several limitations. The effect stimuli from the acquisition 
phase were also used as the prime stimuli in the test phase. Thus, in some conditions 
(Experiment 1), the prime stimuli were faces with direct gazes, while in other cases 
(Experiment 2 and 3), the prime stimuli were faces with averted gazes or closed eyes. 
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This procedural constraint made it difficult to exclude completely the possibility that the 
observed effect was simply caused by the gaze directions of the prime stimuli. Moreover, 
although Elsner and Hommel (2004) showed that action-effect representations are 
acquired by associative learning mechanisms, it remains unresolved whether or not the 
same is true for intersubjective action-effect binding. Regarding temporal contiguity, 
parental responses in early infant-caregiver interactions generally occur within 1–2 
seconds after the infant’s behavior (e.g., Keller, Lohaus, Völker, Cappenberg, & 
Chasiotis, 1999). Such prompt responses to communicative signals allow the infant to 
easily associate his/her action with subsequent parental action. In the case of an 
action-effect in the physical world, such as a tone, the evidence of action-effect binding 
was obtained in one study only if the effect of the action was delayed for no more than 1 
s (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). Can social interaction lengthen this time window? If the 
answer is yes, which factors (e.g., ostensive signals) enlarge it? Regarding contingency, 
Cook, Press, Dickinson, and Heyes (2010) have demonstrated that the development of 
the mirror system is sensitive to sensorimotor contingency. If the development solely 
depended on Hebbian learning (i.e., temporal contiguity), then any observed action 
would become associated with any performed action only if they occurred together. 
However, that is not the case. The finding that the development of the mirror system 
relies on contingency as well as contiguity can explain why most mirror neurons 
respond to the observation and performance of the same action. Is the same true of 
intersubjective action-effect binding? Future research is required to answer these 
questions.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1  Schematic representations of the acquisition phase in Experiments 1(a), 2 (b) 
and 3 (c) and a schematic representation of test phase (d). In the case of (a), if a 
requested response to “＊” is pressing the left button, the requested response is 
congruent with the primed response. 
 
Figure 2  Mean reaction times for congruent and incongruent trials in Experiment 1 
(eye contact), Experiment 2 (averted gaze), and Experiment 3 (closed eyes). Error bars 
represent standard error. 
